Please solve, so I can verify or troubleshoot problem.
(a) For what values of x does this game have a unique Nash equilibrium? What is that equilibrium?
(b) For what values of x does this game have a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium? With what probability, expressed in terms of x, does each player play Yes in this mixed-strategy equilibrium? (c) For the values of x found in part (b), is the game an example of an assurance game, a game of chicken, or a game similar to tennis?
Explain. (d) Let x 5 3. Graph the best-response curves of Rowena and Colin on a p-q coordinate plane. Label all the Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies. (e) Let x 5 1. Graph the best-response curves of Rowena and Colin on a p-q coordinate plane. Label all the Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies.
