John Nash and his buddy return to the bar in which a few weeks ago they failed to secure either a blonde or a brunette. This week they have a new…

John Nash and his buddy return to the bar in which a few weeks ago they failed to secure either a blonde or a brunette. This week they have a new plan. First, John will choose a girl to approach. Then, afterobserving the girl that John approaches, his buddy will choose a girl to approach (he can approach the same girl that John has approached or either of the other ones). There are still 3 girls: one blonde (B) and two brunettes (b1, b2) in the bar. Both John and his friend still prefer blondes to brunettes. They will be successful in approaching any girl, unless she is approached by both of them, in which case they leave the bar with nothing. Represent this situation as an extensive form game. *Which of the following is a Nash equilibrium of the game, but not a subgame perfect equilibrium? For the strategy of John’s friend, let the items in his strategy vector (.,.,.) represent his choices following John’s choosing B, b1 and b2 respectively(a) b1, (b2,B,B)(b) b1, (B,B,B)(c) b1, (b1,B,b2)(d) None of the above. *Which of the following is a Subgame Perfect equilibrium of the game?(a) B, (b1, b1, b1)(b) B, (b1, b2, B)(c) B, (b1,B ,B)(d) None of the above.